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INVESTORS’ REACTION TO ENVIRONMENTAL PERFORMANCE: 
A GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE OF NEWSWEEK’S “GREEN RANKINGS” 
 
Abstract 
We use event study analysis to determine whether the release of Newsweek’s “Global 100 
Ranking” is relevant for the market. We look at one- and two-day event windows to check two 
possible reactions of the market: changes in the value of an equal-weight portfolio, and changes 
in the relative price of the stocks. The results show that the market reacted to the “Global 100 
Ranking” by changing the relative price of the stocks, but not the value of the portfolio. 
Specifically, getting one position closer to the top of Newsweek’s “Global 100 Green Rankings” 
increases the value of an average firm in the list by eleven million dollars. There is also some 
evidence of a stronger reaction of non-US-traded stocks compared to US-traded ones. Non-heavy 
sector stocks display a more robust reaction to than heavy sector stocks. We find that investors in 
US-traded stocks are more interested on past environmental performance than on managerial 
quality, while the opposite is true for investors in non-US-traded stocks. Results are robust to 
alternative model specifications. 
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1. Introduction 
Socially Responsible Investing, an investment strategy that favors corporate practices promoting 
environmental stewardship, consumer protection, human rights, and diversity, represents 12% of 
the $25.2 trillion in total world assets under professional management (Social Investment Forum 
2010). Socially Responsible Investing has become a dynamic research area in recent years 
(Geczy et al. 2003; Kurtz 1997; Sauer 1997; Cummings 2000; Abramson and Chung 2000; 
Bauer et al. 2002; Mill 2006; Lobe, Roithmeier and Walkshausl 2009).1 The popularity of 
Socially Responsible Investing has led to the development of indexes like the Dow Jones 
Sustainability Index (DJSI), in which environmental responsibility weights 9.2% (Fowler and 
Hope 2007).  
A specific environmental index created in 2009 targeting the Socially Responsible 
Investing audience is Newsweek’s “Green Rankings.” Its first edition included the “US 500 List,” 
which comprises the 500 largest publicly-traded US companies. Its second edition, released 
online on October 18th, 2010 at 8 a.m. US East coast time, added the “Global 100 List,” 
involving the 100 largest publicly traded companies worldwide. These Newsweek’s rankings 
mostly use existing information about hundreds of environmental indicators and models. 
Nevertheless, they provide new information by presenting a clear unique measure of 
environmental performance for each company. This publicly available measure may help 
coordinate expectations about how the market weights all of the environmental data available. It 
also gives small investors access to costly environmental information, and increases public 
awareness about the largest companies' environmental performance.  
The present study applies financial tools to assess whether stock values reacted across 
world markets to the announcement of indexes that synthesize the environmental performance of 
the world’s largest publicly-traded companies. The environmental index selected for this purpose 
is the “Global 100 Ranking” (G100), a ranking of the 100 largest public companies by market 
                                                          
1 Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) provide an extensive review of this literature. 
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capitalization. The G100 comprises stocks traded in nine different exchanges across the world, 
which allows us to study whether there are differences in the reactions of investors operating 
within and outside the US stock market.2 Specifically, we analyze (a) whether there are changes 
in the value of an equal-weight portfolio of the companies on the ranking; (b) whether a 
company’s ranking position affects its stock value; (c) whether there are differences in the 
reactions to the ranking of US-traded companies compared to non-US-traded companies; and (d) 
whether the reactions to the ranking differ across industry sectors.  
The present study contributes to the literature in four aspects. First, it adds a world 
market dimension to environmental rankings and the response of investors. This is true because 
the G100 includes stocks traded in nine different exchanges (NYSE, London, Paris, Frankfurt, 
Switzerland, Hong Kong, Shanghai, South Korea, and Tokyo) from companies based in most of 
the continents (e.g., the US and Brazil in America; the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Germany, 
Spain, and Russia in Europe; and China, South Korea, and Japan in Asia). Second, the study 
quantifies the marginal effects of the ranking on stock prices. By employing cross-sectional 
models of abnormal returns against rankings, we are able to determine marginal effects that 
cannot be computed from the cumulative abnormal return statistics typically used in event 
studies. Third, we investigate the impact of rankings on returns by industry sectors. Finally and 
most importantly, to our knowledge it provides the first evidence of the existence of 
heterogeneity among investors in regard to their interest in past performance and managerial 
quality as predictors of future environmental performance. 
Previous studies have analyzed the impact of environmental news and rankings on stock 
markets, with results showing positive correlation between economic and environmental 
performance (Murphy 2002). Environmental news studies have included the Toxic Release 
Inventory of US firms (Khana, Quimio, and Bojilova 1998), pollution information of S&P 500 
companies (Konar and Cohen 2001), explosions on chemical plants worldwide (Capelle-
                                                          
2 We use the G100 because, unlike the “US 500 List” and other environmental indexes, it includes both US- and 
non-US-traded firms. The “US 500 List” has been analyzed by Anderson-Weir (2010), Murguia (2010), 
Blumenshine and Wunnava (2010), van Iwaardenl et al. (2010), and Lyon and Shimshack (2011). 
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Blancard and Laguna 2010), and carbon disclosure (see Busch and Hoffmann 2011 for an 
extended literature review). Some of these studies found significant effects (Capelle-Blancard 
and Laguna 2010; Konar and Cohen 2001), whereas other studies uncovered significant effects 
only when repeated information was released (Khana, Quimio, and Bojilova 1998). Busch and 
Hoffmann (2011) report that, for companies in the Global 2500 Dow Jones, corporate 
environmental performance pays off when using carbon emissions as an outcome-based 
measurement. Margolis, Elfenbein and Walsh (2007) provide an extensive review of the 
literature linking corporate financial performance to corporate social performance. 
Studies involving environmental news and rankings have been performed for Japan 
(Nagayama and Takeda 2007, Yamaguchi 2008, and Takeda and Tomozawa 2008) and the US. 
For the US, some studies used the KLD ranking (Plumlee et al. 2010; Walter 2009; Dawkins and 
Fraas 2011),3 whereas others focused on Newsweek’s ranking (Anderson-Weir 2010; Murguia 
2010; Blumenshine and Wunnava 2010; van Iwaardenl et al. 2010; Lyon and Shimshack 2011). 
In the case of Newsweek’s ranking, Anderson-Weir (2010), Murguia (2010) and van Iwaardenl et 
al. (2010) found no significant effects of Newsweek’s “Green Ranking 2009” on the returns of 
S&P 500 stocks, whereas Lyon and Shimshack (2011) did.4 Blumenshine and Wunnava (2010) 
found that companies with high environmental rankings have higher market capitalization 
values. They concluded that either investors include environmental factors when pricing stocks, 
or that a high environmental rank indicates other intangible variables that contribute to a 
company’s value. 
Succinctly, our results indicate that the market reacted to the G100 by changing the 
relative prices of the stocks included in it, but not the value of the equal-weight portfolio of such 
stocks. Specifically, increasing ten positions in the ranking improved the value of a stock by 
                                                          
3 In general, these papers find a positive relationship between environmental performance and voluntary climate 
change disclosure. 
4 The differences in results may be due to the event windows selected, and the methods employed for estimating 
abnormal returns. Murguia (2010) analyses one and two days (the event day and the next one), Anderson-Weir 
(2010) three days (the day previous to the event plus the event day and the day after), van Iwaardenl et al. (2010) 
one year, and Lyon and Shimshack (2011) three and four days (starting the day of the event). 
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0.0994%, or 113 million dollars for the average company capitalization. There is also evidence 
of a stronger reaction for non-US-traded stocks compared to US-traded stocks, and a more robust 
one for stocks in the non-heavy sector compared to the ones in the heavy sector. Non-US- and 
US-traded stocks reacted different also with respect to past environmental performance and 
environmental managerial quality. In particular, US-traded stock returns appear to be affected by 
past performance and managerial quality, whereas non-US-traded stock returns seem to respond 
only to managerial quality. 
 
2. Theoretical Framework 
Why should investors care about Corporate Social Responsability (CSR)? Chatterji, Levine, and 
Toffel (2009) propose four possible motivations for investors to desire transparency about both 
past social performance and current managerial decisions that influence future social 
performance. The first motivation is based on the idea that socially responsible companies may 
perform better financially by attracting socially responsible consumers, reducing the thread of 
regulation, and reducing concerns from activists and non-governmental organizations. The 
second motivation is the driving force underlying “deontological” investors, who do not want to 
profit from unethical behaviors. Deontological investors care about past performance because 
they want to ensure that current profits were not earned from previous unethical behavior, and 
they also care about current management to avoid future scandals which would taint future 
profits. The third motivation is associated with “consequentialist” investors, who are driven by a 
desire to reward good behavior and decrease the market share of environmental irresponsible 
firms. The fourth and final motivation corresponds to “expressive” investors, who want to show 
to themselves or others that they are socially responsible. 
Kitzmueller and Shimshack (2012) discuss extensively the existing CSR theories and the 
supporting evidence. Regardless of the motives behind CSR, 5 there are investors who seek 
                                                          
5 Ditlev-Simonsen and Midttun (2011) provide a partial answer in this regard. In a survey of corporate leaders they 
find that branding, stakeholders, and value maximization are assumed to be key motivators of CSR by senior 
5 
 
transparency in social rankings, in the sense of combining an accurate summary of past 
performance, and a careful evaluation of current managerial actions likely to influence future 
environmental performance (Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel 2009). 
Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009) suggest that future research should examine how the 
holding of socially responsible funds changes as stakeholders are provided with more 
transparency about corporate social performance; and argue that stakeholders might be 
heterogeneous in their responses to higher-quality information. To the best of our knowledge, the 
present study is the first one to provide evidence of the latter, in the form of US-traded stocks 
reacting differently to the G100 announcement compared to non-US-traded stocks. We also 
provide evidence about what investors look for in practice, which might be beneficial for the 
construction of environmental indexes. We find that investors in US-traded stocks are interested 
on past environmental performance and managerial quality, while for investors in non-US-traded 
stocks only managerial quality is relevant. Our results for US-traded firms are consistent with 
Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009), who found that KLD pollution prevention scores predicted 
pollution or regulation violations for companies regulated by the US Environmental Protection 
Agency. 
According to Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel (2009), measures of (environmental) 
managerial quality are relevant when they contain little noise and have substantial incremental 
information about future environmental outcomes not contained in history alone. They present a 
theoretical model based on these ideas for the selection of the optimal weight in a social index. In 
our study, managerial quality is represented by its environmental policies and its reputation (the 
correlation between both is 0.51), which have a correlation with environmental performance of 
0.35 and 0.03, respectively. It is possible then that managerial quality might be relevant for 
predicting future environmental performance, provided it is not too noisy. 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
managers of the 20 largest Norwegian corporations. They also report that corporate leaders believe sustainability 
and branding should be the key motivators of CSR by senior managers of the 20 largest Norwegian corporations. 
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Errors in CSR measures, and particularly in environmental rankings, may cause market 
inefficiencies and explain different results regarding their impact on stock performance 
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel 2009). Noisy measures may be the reason why some studies find 
little correlation between CSR metrics and financial performance. Alternatively, if consumers or 
investors are misled by the errors, studies finding a positive correlation may overestimate the 
true relationship between actual CSR and financial performance. These limitations must be taken 
into account when evaluating the results of the present study, because measurement errors are 
likely to affect the indexes employed for the analysis.  
 
3. Data 
Data in the present study include the G100, stock returns, nine stock exchange indexes, and 
Fama-French indexes. A detailed explanation follows. 
 
3.1. Newsweek’s “Global 100 Ranking” 
The G100 consists of a ranking of the world's 100 largest (by market capitalization) companies 
according to Newsweek’s “Green Score.” The Green Score is a weighted sum of three component 
scores that are designed to complement each other, namely, the “Environmental Impact Score” 
(EIS) with 45% weight, the “Green Policies Score” (GPS) with 45% weight, and the “Reputation 
Survey Score” (RSS) with 10% weight. The raw component scores were first converted to 
standardized values called Z scores, which reflect how individual companies performed relative 
to the average. The Green Score, as well as each component score, is published on a scale from 1 
(worst performing) to 100 (best performing) (Newsweek 2010). 
The EIS is an index of past environmental performance based on data compiled by 
Trucost. It measures the total environmental impact of a corporation’s global operations (90 %) 
and the disclosure of those impacts (10 %). The EIS incorporates more than 700 metrics, 
including emissions of nine key greenhouse gases, water use, solid-waste disposal, and emissions 
that contribute to acid rain and smog. When publicly disclosed environmental data are available, 
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they are used to evaluate a company performance for each impact metric. An economic input-
output model is used to calculate direct-company and supply-chain impacts in cases where data 
are unavailable (Newsweek 2010). 
The companies are classified into 15 sectors according to the FTSE/Dow Jones Industry 
Classification Benchmark. Therefore, to fairly assess impacts for companies operating in more 
than one industry, a benchmarking system was used. To make it possible to compare companies 
of different size, this system calculates environmental impact in dollars per dollar of sales. This 
accounts for 90% of the raw EIS; the remaining 10 % measures the disclosure of usable data. In 
the case of investing firms, rankings are adjusted to take into account the impact of the equity 
under management (Newsweek 2010). 
The GPS is a managerial performance index based on models provided by MSCI, and 
assesses how a company manages its environmental footprint. To estimate the GPS, MSCI 
created a model that measures the quality of each company’s environmental reporting, policies, 
programs, and initiatives. More than 70 indicators are incorporated into the GPS, and categorized 
into five issues, namely, (a) climate-change policies and performance, (b) pollution policies and 
performance, (c) product impact, (d) environmental stewardship, and (e) management of 
environmental issues. They address, respectively, how well each company manages its carbon 
emissions; how well each company manages its non-carbon emissions to air, water, and land; the 
life-cycle impacts of each company’s products and services; how well each company manages 
and uses its local resources; and the quality of each company’s track record of managing 
environmental risks. Data on regulatory compliance, lawsuits, controversies, and community 
impacts are also among the indicators taken into account within each category (Newsweek 2010). 
The RSS is another managerial index, but based on an opinion survey of CSR 
professionals, academics, and other environmental experts who subscribe to 
CorporateRegister.com. A total of 14,921 surveys were sent out asking each respondent to rate a 
random sample of 15 companies on a sliding scale (1 to 100) from “laggard” to “leader” in three 
key green areas: environmental performance, commitment, and communications. Of those 
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surveyed, 2,480 were environmental sector specialists that were only asked to score companies 
in their sector of expertise. The survey’s response rate was 12 %, twice the rate for the 2009 
reputation survey. Chief-executive scores, sector specialists, and other participants were given a 
weight of three, two, and one, respectively. Each company’s performance, commitment, and 
communications scores were then averaged to produce its raw RSS (Newsweek 2010). 
Companies that appear on both the US and Global lists in the 2010 edition have different 
Green Scores and component scores because normalizations are different. Moreover, it is not 
possible to compare company scores over time due to the changes in the methods used to 
construct them (Newsweek 2010). 
 
3.2. Stock Returns and Indexes 
Values of stocks and market indexes adjusted by splits and dividends were obtained from Yahoo 
Finance.6 When a company’s stock data were not available for the period under study, the 
company’s web site was used as the source of information. In three instances (Nissan Motor, 
Toshiba, and Lukoil), pink-sheet data (i.e., over-the-counter transactions in the US) were used as 
a last resource. 
Seventy one of the companies in the G100 are traded in the US. Out of the remaining 29 
companies not traded in the US, 25 are traded in Europe and four are traded in Asia. For 
companies trading in more than one stock market and currency, the market selected was the one 
with the highest average daily volume. Since the companies in the ranking are traded in nine 
different stock markets, the indexes used include NYA (New York, 1,900 largest stocks), the 
SSE Composite Index (Shanghai, all stocks), the Hang Seng Index (Hong Kong, 50 largest 
stocks), the TOPIX (Japan, all stocks), the Kospi Composite Index (Korea, all stocks), the 
SBF250 (Paris, CAC-All Tradeables) (France, all stocks), CDAX (Frankfurt, all stocks), SMI 
                                                          
6 Yahoo Finance web page for US and Asian stocks, and United Kingdom Yahoo Finance web pages for European 
stocks. 
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Expanded (Switzerland, 95% of the market capitalization), and the FTSE All-Share (United 
Kingdom, 98% of the market capitalization). 
For each stock in the G100 and the nine market indexes, daily excess returns were 
calculated by subtracting the risk-free rate (measured as the interest rate on the one-month 
Treasury bill, downloaded from French’s web page (French 2011)) from the respective rate of 
return. Following the literature (Fama and French 1998; Griffin 2002; Hou, Karolyi, and Kho 
2011; Fama and French 2012), rates of return for the 29 non-US-traded stocks and the market 
indexes other than NYA, were computed by first converting the values denominated in foreign 
currencies into US dollars.7 For this purpose, the corresponding daily exchange rates from Oanda 
(2012) were used. 
Fama-French factors for US-traded stocks were downloaded from French’s web page 
(French 2011). The Fama-French factors are the small-minus-big factor (SMBt), the high-minus-
low factor (HMLt), and the factor consisting of the average return on the two high prior return 
portfolios minus the average return on the two low prior return portfolios at time t (MOMt). SMB𝑡𝑡 is the difference between the return on a portfolio of small stocks and the return on a 
portfolio of large stocks at time t, whereas HML𝑡𝑡 is the difference between the return on a 
portfolio of high-book-to-market stocks and the return on a portfolio of low-book-to-market 
stocks at time t. Unfortunately, to the best of our knowledge, local analogs of the SMBt, HML𝑡𝑡, 
and MOMt factors for non-US-traded stocks are not available on a daily basis (Ken French 
personal communication).8 
 
4. Methods 
                                                          
7 This procedure ignores exchange rate risk (Fama and French 1998; Griffin 2002; Hou, Karolyi, and Kho 2011; 
Fama and French 2012). It implies purchasing power parity, and that the stocks considered cannot be used to hedge 
exchange risk (Fama and French 2012). 
8 Fama and French (2012) constructed monthly factors for 23 different countries to study their effect on international 
stock returns. Kubota and Takehara (1997) also constructed monthly factors for Japan. Exeter University has factors 
calculated with a monthly frequency for the United Kingdom 
(http://xfi.exeter.ac.uk/researchandpublications/portfoliosandfactors/index.php). For Canada there are daily factors, 
but the series has been updated only until 2009 
(http://expertise.hec.ca/professorship_information_financiere_strategique/fama-french-canadian-factors/). 
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Based on the previous discussion, it is hypothesized that the publication of the G100 may have 
impacted the listed firms in two ways, namely, (a) by affecting the overall value of the firms 
comprised in the G100 relative to firms not included in the index, and/or (b) by inducing changes 
in the relative prices of the G100 firms according to their respective rankings. A third testable 
hypothesis is whether investors were more interested in past environmental performance or 
present managerial skills. 
The first hypothesis is tested by analyzing the significance of the abnormal return of the 
equal-weight portfolio of firms in the G100 when the index was released. The second and third 
ones are tested by regressing the companies’ abnormal returns against their respective rankings 
(cross-section OLS models). Both methods are explained in detail in the following subsections. 
Finding out that the aforementioned cross-section OLS models are statistically significant would 
support the idea that the market reacted to the G100 announcement. These findings cannot 
explain how the market used the information released,9 but might provide evidence regarding 
whether investors care more about managerial practices or past performance, and whether there 
is homogeneity across stocks in this regard. In contrast, the statistical insignificance of these 
OLS models would indicate that there was no evidence of the G100 release affecting the market 
during the event window.  
In this paper event studies methods are applied to assess whether the release of the G100 
had an impact on the values of the firms included in it.10 Event studies rely on the estimation of 
each firm's abnormal returns (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏) at date 𝜏𝜏, which are a measure of the unexpected change in 
security holders’ wealth associated with the event. Abnormal returns are calculated as 
 
(1) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 − 𝐸𝐸 �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏| 𝑋𝑋𝜏𝜏�, 
                                                          
9 Our tests do not distinguish among the possible theoretical motivations (presented earlier in section 2) underlying 
investors' reaction to the G100. For example, investors may react because the ranking contains new information. 
Alternatively, they may react because the release of the ranking helps coordinate how to interpret the large amount 
of information condensed in the G100, even though the basic information might not be new. 
10 Event studies in financial markets examine the behavior of firms’ stock prices around a specific event (see 
MacKinlay (1997) for a detailed explanation of event study methods). 
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where 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 denotes company 𝑖𝑖's excess return at time 𝜏𝜏, and 𝐸𝐸 �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏| 𝑋𝑋𝜏𝜏� is company 𝑖𝑖's expected 
excess return at time 𝜏𝜏 conditional on the value of the vector of variables 𝑋𝑋𝜏𝜏. Here, the 
conditional expected return 𝐸𝐸 �𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏| 𝑋𝑋𝜏𝜏� is estimated by means of two alternative models, 
namely, the market model (2), and an extended version of the Fama-French Four Factor Model 
(FFFM) (3)11 
 
(2) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = α𝑖𝑖 +  β𝑖𝑖 MARKETRF𝑡𝑡  +  η𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, 
(3) 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 = α𝑖𝑖 +  β𝑖𝑖 MARKETRF𝑡𝑡  +  s𝑖𝑖  USSMB𝑡𝑡 +  h𝑖𝑖 USHML𝑡𝑡 +  mi USMOM𝑡𝑡 + ϵ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡, 
 
where MARKETRF𝑡𝑡 is a vector comprising the excess rates of return on the nine market indexes; USSMB𝑡𝑡, USHML𝑡𝑡, and USMOM𝑡𝑡 are Fama-French factors for US-traded stocks; α𝑖𝑖, β𝑖𝑖, si, h𝑖𝑖, 
and m𝑖𝑖 are regression coefficients; and η𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 and ϵ𝑖𝑖,𝑡𝑡 are regression residuals. 
The nine market returns comprised in MARKETRF𝑡𝑡 are included as explanatory variables, 
because the existing literature on integrated international asset pricing indicates that it is more 
appropriate to use factors specific to the markets where stocks are listed than global factors 
(Karolyi and Stulz 2003, Griffin 2002, Fama and French 2012).12 The estimation using nine 
market factors improves identification. Although it would be desirable for the market returns in 
regressions (2) and (3) to exclude the companies in the ranking, such data were not available. 
The second best option is to use a portfolio for each stock market that includes the companies of 
interest, but whose performance is not strongly affected by such companies. This is achieved by 
                                                          
11 FFFM is the result of the work of Fama and French (1993) and Jegadeesh and Timman (1993). FFFM extends the 
traditional single factor market model to explain abnormal returns that the latter model was unable to account for. 
12 We thank an anonymous referee for this suggestion. Fama and French (2012) examined local versions of the 
factor models in which the returns to be explained are from the same region, and found that global models perform 
poorly compared to local ones. Their results are in line with Griffin (2002), who found that country-specific factors 
explain returns better for portfolios and individual stocks in the cases of US, United Kingdom, Canada and Japan. 
Hybrid models including both local and global factors have been found to add no explanatory power compared to 
their purely local counterparts (Griffin 2002, Fama and French 2012). Interestingly, we find that local market factors 
from markets other than the one where the stock is traded are significant in explaining returns (e.g., US market 
affects European and Asian traded stocks, and Asian markets affect Asian-based companies trading in the US). 
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employing market portfolios that comprise a large number of other companies, causing a dilution 
effect.13 
Ideally, the set of explanatory variables in regression (3) should also include local Fama-
French factors for the non-US-traded stocks (Fama and French 2012). That is not possible, 
however, because daily SMB, HML and MOM local factors are available only for US-traded 
stocks. Hence, rather than omitting the US Fama-French factors, they are included because they 
may help explain non-US-traded stock returns. Proceeding in this manner creates no estimation 
problems; in fact, it greatly facilitates the estimation from a computational point of view, as for 
the case of the companies it reduces a 100-equation SUR to an OLS estimation problem.14 
Based on the length of the estimation periods typically employed in the previous 
literature (MacKinlay 1997), regressions (2) and (3) were estimated using data for dates 𝑡𝑡 = 
10/5/2009 through 𝑡𝑡 = 10/4/2010. This period excluded the 10 trading days before the release of 
the information, to avoid biases from potential information leaks close to the event (MacKinlay 
1997). The selected interval resulted in 250 observations for US-traded companies and some 
non-US-traded firms. For other non-US-traded companies the number of observations was 
slightly different from 250, due to differences in holidays and other non-trading days across 
countries over the fixed calendar period. Given the estimates of regressions (2) and (3), abnormal 
returns for the date of interest 𝜏𝜏 are respectively computed from equations (4) and (5), 
respectively: 
 
                                                          
13 The dilution effect is important in all stock markets. For example, only 71 out of 1,900 firms in the NYA are 
included in the G100, representing 34% of the market capitalization of the New York Stock Exchange. Stocks in 
other markets have even lower relative market capitalizations. 
14 It seems unlikely that including local SBM, HML, and MOM factors would change the general results of the 
present study. This is true because the cross section models for the 71 US-traded stocks yield very similar results 
whether the Fama-French factors are included or not (see tables 8 and A4). The effect of not including local SMB, 
HML and MOM factors might be negligible especially due to the size of the firms. Fama and French (2012) find that 
SMB, HML and MOM vary with firm size, with the exception of Japan. While they do not find size premiums in 
any region studied, there are value premiums in all regions and momentum premiums in all but Japan. Previous 
studies have also reported the lack of momentum in Japan (Assness, Moskiwitz, and Pedersen 2009; Chui, Titman, 
and Wei 2010; Kubota and Takehara 1997). Interestingly, both value and momentum premiums are smaller for 
larger firms (Fama and French 2012). 
13 
 
(4) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 − � α�𝑖𝑖 + β�𝑖𝑖 MARKETRF𝜏𝜏 � =  η�𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏, 
(5) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 = 𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 − � α�𝑖𝑖 + β�𝑖𝑖 MARKETRF𝜏𝜏  +  s�𝑖𝑖 USSMB𝜏𝜏 + h�𝑖𝑖 USHML𝜏𝜏 +  m�  USMOM𝜏𝜏� =  ϵ�𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏. 
 
Using abnormal returns 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 resolves the potential problem of reverse causality (i.e., the G100 
may be correlated with financial performance simply because more profitable firms in the past 
were able to invest more in CSR). That is, here correlation can be interpreted as the G100 
impacting abnormal returns, because we control for past performance when estimating expected 
returns. 
 
4.1. Equal-Weight Portfolio’s Abnormal Return Test Statistic 
To assess whether the release of the information increased the value of the entire set of 
companies on the list, the following test statistic was employed 
 
(6) 𝐽𝐽1 ≡
𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����𝜏𝜏
𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴�����𝜏𝜏
~𝑁𝑁(0,1), 
 
where 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����𝜏𝜏 ≡ ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏𝑖𝑖=100𝑖𝑖=1 100⁄ , 𝜎𝜎𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴����𝜏𝜏 is the corresponding standard deviation, 𝑁𝑁(0,1) is the 
standard normal distribution, and 𝜏𝜏 is the day of the online release of the G100, i.e., October 18th, 
2010.15 That is, the test statistic 𝐽𝐽1 is the equally-weighted portfolio's abnormal return normalized 
by its standard deviation. 
 
4.2. Cross Sectional Models 
The test statistic 𝐽𝐽1 is not recommended to test whether the G100 release affected relative stock 
prices according to their ranking performance. There are at least two reasons why this is the case. 
                                                          
15 The independence assumption of individual firms’ abnormal returns is violated in the present application, because 
the event time is perfectly clustered due to the fact that information was released at the same time for all companies. 
A solution is to estimate the abnormal returns of a portfolio of companies (MacKinlay 1997). 
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First, there is a loss in estimation efficiency, because the sample must be split into company 
groups according to ranking positions (e.g., high-, medium-, and low-ranked firms) to assess the 
effect of the ranking position using 𝐽𝐽1. Second and more importantly, finding out statistically 
significantly different 𝐽𝐽1s would only allow us to sign the marginal effect of the rankings. For 
these reasons, we apply a cross-sectional approach to analyze whether the market reacted by 
changing the relative price of the stocks comprised in the G100. 
The advocated procedure consists of a cross-section OLS regression of each firm's 
abnormal returns (𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏) based on equations (4) or (5), against the respective firm’s ranking 
(GREENRANKING𝑖𝑖): 
 
(7) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝜏𝜏 = α𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 +  β𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 GREENRANKING + 𝜑𝜑𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏, 
 
where 𝜑𝜑𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 is a regression residual, and 𝜏𝜏 is October 18th, 2010 (i.e., the day of the online 
release of the G100). To further investigate the firm-specific impact of the G100, cross-sectional 
OLS regressions (8) through (10) were fitted, as well: 
 
(8) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝜏𝜏 = α𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝜏𝜏 +  β𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝜏𝜏 GREENSCORE + 𝜑𝜑𝐺𝐺𝐺𝐺,𝜏𝜏, 
 
(9) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝜏𝜏 = α𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 +  β𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 EIS + β𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 GPS + β𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 RSS + 𝜑𝜑𝐸𝐸𝐺𝐺𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏, 
 
(10) 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝜏𝜏 = α𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 +  β𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏 EISRSS + 𝜑𝜑𝐸𝐸𝐴𝐴,𝜏𝜏, 
 
where GREENSCORE, EIS, GPS, and RSS are respectively the firm-specific Green Score, EIS, 
GPS, and RSS, and EISRSS = EIS − RSS. Robust standard errors were computed for all 
regressions.16 
                                                          
16 Regression (10) corrects EIS by RSS, to control for previously available information. 
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To investigate the robustness of the findings, cross-sectional regressions analogous to (6)-
(10) were also fit using each firm's cumulative abnormal returns over the two-day event window 
consisting of October 18th and 19th, 2010 (i.e., the day of the G100 release plus the following 
day, to account for time zone differences across countries). That is, the dependent variable in 
such regressions consists of 
 
(10) 𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,(𝜏𝜏1:𝜏𝜏2) ≡ ∑ 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏𝜏𝜏=𝜏𝜏2𝜏𝜏=𝜏𝜏1 , 
 
where 𝜏𝜏1 and 𝜏𝜏2 are respectively October 18th and 19th, 2010. Further, cross-sectional regressions 
were also estimated separately for eight different sets of companies, namely, (a) all of the 
companies, (b) G100 top 50 companies, (c) G100 bottom 50 companies, (d) heavy sector 
companies,17 (e) non-heavy sector companies, (f) US-traded companies, (g) non-US-traded 
companies, and (h) non-heavy sector US-traded companies. A total of 128 cross-sectional 
models were estimated, 64 with 𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,𝜏𝜏 as the explanatory variable, and the other 64 with 
𝐶𝐶𝐴𝐴𝐴𝐴𝑖𝑖,(𝜏𝜏1:𝜏𝜏2) instead. 
 
5. Results and Discussion 
The next two subsections discuss the findings regarding the impact of the G100 on both the 
general and the relative value of the firms included in it. 
 
5.1. The Impact of the G100 on the General Value of the Listed Firms 
Result 1. The release of the ranking did not increase the price of the equal-weight portfolio of 
companies in the G100. 
                                                          
17 Industries are classified as belonging to the heavy sector if they are potentially highly pollutant. The heavy sector 
includes basic materials; consumer products and cars; general industrials, industrial goods, oil and gas; transport and 
aerospace; and utilities. The non-heavy sector consists of banks and insurance; food and beverage; media, travel, and 
leisure; pharmaceuticals; retail; and technology. 
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The test statistic 𝐽𝐽1 is statistically non-significant for the equal-weight portfolio. Thus, the release 
of the ranking did not affect the price of the portfolio of companies in the G100, provided that 
there are no other confounding effects. One may argue that there is no reason for an 
improvement on the value of the portfolio, because the new information allows only for a 
comparison among the companies on the list. A change in the value of the portfolio would have 
implied that a comparison with companies not included in the G100 was possible.  
Event studies analyzing one firm or a small number of firms often check for confounding 
effects, especially when testing the significance of the test statistic 𝐽𝐽1. It may happen that other 
“new information” affects the performance of the company on the day the information of interest 
is released, leading to incorrect conclusions. On the day the G100 was released, the major news 
were related to higher-than-expected earnings from Citigroup, and an improvement in the 
housing sector that pushed prices up (cnn.money.com a). Companies in the banking sector were 
among that day’s top performers, with average abnormal returns of 0.0091%, or 0.58 standard 
deviations higher than the average of all companies in the ranking (table 1). This may have 
caused the price of the portfolio to go up, creating a positive bias on the estimation of the effect 
of being in the G100. 
In some cross-sectional models the next-day information is also used. The stock market 
declined the day after the release of the G100, due to reports that a group of bondholders were 
trying to force Bank of America to repurchase bad mortgages. There was also a surprise rate hike 
by the Chinese government, and mixed data on the housing market and corporate results 
(cnn.money.com b).18 Not analyzing these confounding effects might bias the estimates of the 
marginal effect of the G100 if the “new information” is correlated with the ranking. However, it 
is difficult to find plausible reasons for such kind of correlation to exist. 
Confounding effects can be ignored for the remainder of the study, because of the use of 
cross-sectional models and the methodology used to construct the G100. If on the day of the 
                                                          
18 In particular, Bank of America reported a third-quarter net loss of $7.3 billion, Goldman Sachs disclosed a 40% 
plunge in profit for the third quarter, J&J stated a dip in sales, Yahoo reported less than expected sales, and Intel 
announced an up to $8 billion investment. 
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G100 release another event(s) affected returns across all firms, its impact would be controlled for 
by the constant in the cross-sectional models.19 This would also be true for any event affecting a 
group of companies, provided the distribution of such group in the G100 is similar to the 
distribution of all the companies in the list. In particular, since the G100 is constructed to make 
the ranking comparable across industries, any event affecting firms in a specific industry should 
only affect the constant of the estimated cross-sectional models.20 
 
5.2. The Impact of the G100 Release on the Relative Prices of the Listed Firms 
Key statistics for the cross-sectional models’ first estimation step are presented in Table 2. Out of 
the 100 estimated FFFMs, the F-test indicates that 97 of them are statistically significant at the 
95% confidence level, with a median explanatory power of 46%. For the 97 significant models, 
the market index in which the stock is traded is typically significantly different from zero, 
whereas indexes for other markets besides US are not. The coefficient corresponding to the NYA 
market index is significantly different from zero in 92 of the models (66 US-traded stocks, 25 
European-traded stocks, and one Asian-traded stock), and has a median value of 0.8851, a 95th 
percentile of 1.5084 and a 5th percentile of 0.2734. 
Asian stock exchange indexes affected American companies and some Asian and 
European companies. The coefficients corresponding to Shanghai’s SSE Composite Index and 
Hong Kong’s Hang Seng Index are significant in six of the models.21 Japanese and Korean stock 
exchange indexes affected US and European stocks. The coefficient corresponding to Japan’s 
                                                          
19 For example, the news about improvement in the housing sector might have pushed prices up in general, which 
would affect the constant, but not the slope, of the cross sectional models. 
20 In the case of banks and insurance (the industry involving most of the news on the day of the G100 release), the 
ranking of the companies ranges from 9 to 89, covering almost all of the ranking range. 
21 The SSE Composite Index coefficient is significant for one Korean company traded in Seoul, three US-traded 
stocks, and one European stock. It has a median value of -0.0121, a 95th percentile of 0.1419, and a 5th percentile of 
-0.2239. The Hang Seng Index coefficient is significant for one US-traded company, and surprisingly none of the 
four Chinese companies traded in Hong Kong. It has a median value of -0.0180, a 95th percentile of 0.0852 and a 
5th percentile of -0.1304. 
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Topix Index is significant in 4 of the models,22 and the one corresponding to South Korea’s 
Kospi Composite Index is significant at the 95% confidence level in 9 of the models.23 
European indexes are significant in models of European stocks and US-traded stocks of 
European and US companies. The coefficient for France’s CAC-All (SCB250) is significant in 
seven of the models,24 for Germany’s CDAX in seven,25 for Switzerland’s SMI Expanded Index 
in nine,26 and for the United Kingdom’s FTSE All-Share Index coefficient in 4 of the models.27 
The Fama-French factors SMB, HML and UMD are significantly different from zero in a 
considerable proportion of the US-traded stock models, whereas they are non-significant for 
most of non-US-traded stocks. SMB is significantly different from zero for 16 companies –all of 
them US-traded–, HML is significant for 31 companies (26 US-traded, four Europe- and one 
Asia-traded), and UMD is significant for 17 companies (14 US-traded, and three Europe-traded). 
The likely explanation for the lack of significance of the SMB, HML, and UMD daily factors in 
the models for non-US-traded stocks is that such factors are US-based. Ideally, the models 
should include exchange-specific SMB, HML, and UMD factors, but as explained earlier they 
were not available at a daily frequency for the period and stock exchanges of interest. 
Given the similarity of the results obtained from the 128 cross-sectional models fitted in 
the second step, only the 64 models estimated using the FFFM abnormal returns are reported 
here. The other models are presented as tables A1 through A8 in the Appendix. All tables in the 
paper have the same structure. Models numbered 1 to 4 have as independent variable the Green 
                                                          
22 The Topix Index coefficient is significant for four US-traded stocks. It has a median value of 0.0132, a 95th 
percentile of 0.1885 and a 5th percentile of -0.1541. 
23 The Kospi Composite Index coefficient is significant for one Chinese stock traded in Hong Kong; seven US-
traded stocks, and one European, and has a median value of 0.0213, a 95th percentile of 0.2208 and a 5th percentile 
of -0.3617. 
24 The SBF250 coefficient is significant for seven US-traded stocks. It has a median value of -0.0473, a 95th 
percentile of 0.4322 and a 5th percentile of -0.4741. 
25 The CDAXX Index coefficient is significant for one European traded stocks, and six US-traded stocks –two of 
European companies–. It has a median value of -0.0350, a 95th percentile of 0.3732 and a 5th percentile of -0.5910. 
26 SMI Expanded Index coefficient is significant for 8 US-traded stocks –five of European companies- and one 
Asian. It has a median value of 0.0800, a 95th percentile of 0.4355, and a 5th percentile of -0.3255. 
27 The FTSE All-Share Index coefficient is significant for two Europe-traded stocks, one of which correspond to a 
company based in the United Kingdom with stocks traded in London; and two US-traded stocks, both of which 
consist of European companies. It has a median value of 0.0344, a 95th percentile of 0.4078, and a 5th percentile of 
-0.3255. 
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Score, Green ranking, green components (EIS, GPS, and RSS), and EIS minus RSS (EISRSS), 
respectively. Version (a) of the models denotes the case where abnormal returns are measured 
only on the day of the information release, whereas version (b) corresponds to the case where 
abnormal returns are evaluated over both the day of release and the next day. 
 
Result 2: An eleven million dollar step: Getting one position closer to the top of Newsweek’s 
G100 increases the value of an average firm in the list by 11.4 million dollars.28  
Ranking position and the Green Score affected stock prices on the day the information was 
released in the expected direction: negative for the ranking position, and positive for the Green 
Score (see Figure 1). Table 3 shows that at least 5.7% of the abnormal returns on the event day 
were explained in three different models by the Green Score (model 1-a), ranking position 
(model 2-a), and Green Score components (model 3-a), respectively. According to these results, 
moving ten positions closer to the top of the ranking increases the value of a company by 
0.0994% with a 99% confidence level (model 2-a). By comparison, the absolute value of the 
daily return of the companies in the G100 during the estimation period (i.e., 10/5/2009 through 
10/4/2010) was 0.014% on average. 
 
Result 3: G100’s top 50 performers reacted more strongly to the ranking than the bottom 50 
performers. 
We tested for the presence of non-linearities, and found that the top 50 performers reacted more 
strongly than the bottom 50 performers to the Green Score, the ranking position, and the 
components in both event windows. Tables 4 and 5 show respectively the results of the models 
for the top and bottom performers. There is a proportionally larger participation of heavy sector 
stocks in the bottom 50 performers (22 companies), which reacted more weakly to the ranking. 
To test for this confounding effect, we estimated regressions of the bottom 50 performers by 
                                                          
28 The average capitalization of a firm in the list was 115 billion dollars as of September 2010. As a consequence, 
moving up one position in the ranking, which increases the value of a stock by 0.00994%, represents 11.4 million 
dollars. 
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sector. Results are omitted to save space, but they show that bottom 50 heavy sector stocks were 
not affected by being in the ranking (none of the models are significant). In contrast, non-heavy 
sector stocks in the bottom 50 did react to the EIS on the day the information was released (the 
coefficient estimate equals 1.542 and is significantly different from zero at the 10% level). The 
difference between the top and bottom companies may be explained in part by the weaker 
reaction of heavy sector stocks, presented later in the paper. 
 
Result 4: Green Score components explain better the market reaction than the Green Score itself: 
EIS has a positive effect on stock prices, whereas RSS does not have a significant effect. 
The explanatory power is higher using the components of the Green Score than employing the 
Green Score itself (model 3-a versus model 1-a on table 3). Out of the three components, the 
only one significantly different from zero is the EIS. The RSS coefficient is non-significant in 
either event window, which may be reasonable because it reflects the market expectations 
regarding the environmental performance of the firms. The non-significance may be explained 
by the efficient market hypothesis: the release provided information that had already been 
incorporated into the prices. The GPS is not significantly different from zero either, suggesting 
that neither the companies’ reputation nor their policies were relevant new market information. 
Adding two non-significant components to the EIS to calculate the Green Score seems to distort 
the EIS signal, reducing the explanatory power of the Green Score model compared to the 
components’ model. 
Stocks in the non-heavy sector reacted fast to the G100, and took into account only the 
EIS (table 6). In contrast, stocks in the heavy sector were neither significantly affected by the 
G100 nor by the individual scores (table 7). Only there was a close to significant reaction to the 
Green Score (at a 90% confidence level) on a two day window.  Ranking position and the Green 
Score impacted non-heavy stock prices on the day of the information release in the expected 
direction: negative for the ranking position and positive for the Green Score. According to the 
results, moving up ten positions in the ranking and improving the Green Score by ten points 
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increased the expected value of a non-heavy sector company by 0.12% and 0.20%, respectively 
(table 6, models 1-a and 2-a). Increasing the EIS by ten points raised a company’s abnormal 
returns by 0.129%.  
 
Result 5: Non-US traded stocks exhibit a stronger and “more prolonged” reaction compared to 
US-traded stocks. 
The reaction to the release of G100 of non-US traded stocks in the two-day event window was 
significantly different from zero, and larger than the one- and two-day reactions of US-traded 
stocks (tables 8 and 9). The reaction of US-traded stocks was in most cases slightly smaller than, 
but not significantly different from, the reaction of non-US stocks for the one-day event window. 
According to these results, moving ten positions closer to the top of the ranking increases the 
expected value of a US traded company by 0.113% with a 99% confidence level (model 2-a table 
8), for the one event window. Within US-traded stocks, non-heavy sector companies were the 
ones that significantly reacted to the G100 (table 10); moving ten positions closer to the top of 
the ranking increased the value of a US-traded company in the non-heavy sector by 0.150%. The 
effect was driven by the EIS rather than GPS or RSS (Model 3-a table 10). For non-US traded 
companies, the corresponding expected increase is 0.323% (model 2-b table 9, 95% confidence 
level), for the two-day event window. The apparently slower and more prolonged reaction for 
non-US traded stocks may be explained by differences in time zones, as 8am US Eastern Time 
Zone corresponds to 2pm in Europe and afterhours trading in Asian exchanges.  
One possible explanation for the different behavior of US- vs. non-US traded companies 
is the well-documented home bias puzzle.29 European and Asian investors trade more non-US 
stocks due to the equity home bias (Sercu and Vanpee 2007). Also, European (French and 
                                                          
29 The equity home bias is the difference between the relative weight of domestic equity in the portfolio of country j 
and the relative weight of country j in the total world market. The equity home bias of the market portfolio in 2004 
was 0.81 for the US, 0.77 for EMU members, and 0.79 non-EMU EU members (Schoenmaker and Bosch 2008); and 
in 2005 was 0.78 for Hong Kong, 0.79 for Japan, and 0.96 for Korea (Sercu and Vanpee 2007). An extended 
literature review of home bias puzzle is available in Karolyi and Stulz (2003), and a list of home bias by country is 
available in table 1 of Sercu and Vanpee (2007). 
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German) consumers are more willing to support CSR than Americans (Maignan 2001). Another 
possible explanation for the higher reaction of non-US traded stocks is that more of the released 
information was relevant for the market, which is plausible because some of the US-traded 
companies had been assessed the previous year in the “US 500 List” (table 9). 
The Green Score components explain 22% and 26% of the non-US traded stocks 
abnormal returns in the one- and two-day event window models, respectively (models 3-a and 3-
b in table 9). The GPS is significant in the one- and two-day event window with similar 
coefficients while the EIS is only jointly significant in the two-day event window. Interestingly, 
the RSS coefficient is negative, a sign of investors’ adjusting for existing information.30 
Significant cross-sectional models using FFFM abnormal returns had lower explanatory power 
than the ones excluding the US Fama-French factors, e.g., 5.7% vs. 9.7% in model 1-a, and 6.4% 
vs. 9.7% in model 2-a in tables 3 and A1, respectively. The sign and magnitude of the 
coefficients of cross-sectional models based on the market factor model abnormal returns are 
consistent with the significant cross-sectional models based on the FFFM abnormal returns. One 
difference is that more models become also significant in the two-day event window.  In this 
sense, the results presented here are the most conservative ones. 
Why did the estimated market factor model abnormal returns outperform the FFFM ones 
in the cross-sectional models? We expected the opposite because the FFFMs have higher 
explanatory power, as they include the US Fama-French factors in addition to the market returns. 
However, in most instances the additional factors in the FFFM were non-significant (table 2), 
and including them added noise to our estimation of expected returns. Therefore, the FFFM 
model is likely to incorporate unwarranted noise. This may end up being reflected in the 
predicted abnormal returns for the day of the event, thereby making the FFFM-based cross-
sectional models lose explanatory power and even turn non-significant, especially in the two-day 
event window case. 
                                                          
30 The reaction of non-US traded stocks in the two-day window EISRSS model (model 4-b in table 9) is significant 
at the 10% level and positive as expected. For each ten point difference in EISRSS, the expected abnormal returns of 
a foreign traded company in the two-day event window increases by 0.2091%. 
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Previous results support the idea that a new “green” process which affects a company's 
relative G100 performance will impact the firm's stock price. Consequently, the G100 becomes a 
tournament that (provided its information is correct) enhances the efficiency of investments in 
environmental performance by creating an extra incentive to improve environmental 
performance.31 This occurs because firms that are able to improve their position in the G100 
ranking at the lowest cost are the ones most likely to end up doing so. This result is independent 
of which mechanism is behind the investors’ reaction. 
 
6. Conclusions 
The present study adds a world market dimension to environmental rankings and the response of 
investors, quantifies the marginal effects of the G100 on stock prices, and investigates the impact 
of rankings on returns by industry sectors. Further, to the best of our knowledge it is the first 
study providing evidence of the existence of heterogeneity among investors regarding their 
interest in past performance and managerial quality as predictors of future environmental 
performance, which has implications for the construction of optimal environmental indexes 
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel 2009).  
Our results indicate that the market reacted to the G100 by changing the relative prices of 
the stocks included in it, but not the value of the equal-weight portfolio of such stocks. The 
magnitude of the effect was sizeable: moving one position closer to the top of Newsweek’s G100 
raised the value of an average firm in the list by 11.4 million dollars. This represents an increase 
in the stock price of 0.0994%, or seven times the average of the absolute daily rate of return of 
the companies in the G100 during the estimation period (i.e., 10/5/2009 through 10/4/2010). 
There is also evidence of a stronger reaction to the ranking position for top 50 companies in the 
G100 compared to bottom 50, for non-US-traded stocks compared to US-traded stocks, and of a 
more robust reaction for stocks in the non-heavy sector compared to the ones in the heavy sector. 
                                                          
31 It must be noted that the methodology framework applied in this paper cannot account for the dynamic dimension 
of green investments. 
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The finding that the equal-weight portfolio return was not affected by the G100 release 
was expected, because the presence of the companies on the G100 list was only defined by their 
size. The use of a two-step procedure allowed us to identify a market effect that the standard 
event study method using only statistics of cumulative abnormal returns for the entire set might 
have ignored. The new information for the market was the performance of each company relative 
to the other ones in the set, and that is why the cross section in the second step was able to 
identify that effect in the firms’ stock prices. The cross section also allowed us to estimate 
marginal effects. 
The G100’s top 50 performers reacted more strongly to the ranking release than the 
bottom 50 ones. The existence of this nonlinearity may be explained in part by a larger presence 
of heavy sector companies (which reacted less to the ranking) in the bottom 50. 
Stocks of companies in the non-heavy sector had a more robust reaction to the G100 
release than their heavy sector counterparts. Unlike heavy sector stocks, non-heavy sector stocks 
reacted significantly across all model specifications. One possible reason for this finding is that 
firms in the non-heavy sector might be closer to final consumers, and consequently pay more 
attention to consumers’ reactions to environmental performance. Another plausible explanation 
is that heavy sector firms have an input matrix of raw materials and energy that has low elasticity 
of substitution, whereas companies in the non-heavy sector might have better more opportunities 
to improve their environmental performance at lower cost. For example, it might be easier to 
reduce energy consumption per unit of sales for a retail company (by replacing electric 
appliances with efficient ones, buying more locally, etc.) than for an iron company that basically 
consumes energy. 
Across all model specifications, non US-traded stocks had a stronger reaction for a one-
day event windows than US-traded stocks. In the case of a two-day event window, US-traded 
stocks had no significant reaction, whereas non-US-traded stocks exhibited a stronger reaction 
than with a one-day window. There are at least three possible explanations for this result. One 
explanation is that US-traded companies reacted as expected according to the efficient market 
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hypothesis, and extending the event window only dilutes the effect making it non-significant. A 
second possible reason is that non-US-traded companies were included in a public environmental 
ranking for the first time, whereas some US-traded companies had already been in the “US 500 
List” published in 2009. A third explanation is that most of the non-US-traded companies are 
European, for which GPS might provide better predictions about future performance. Given the 
different regulatory history and environment in Europe, expectations about future regulation 
might motivate investors' hedging behavior.  
The use of stocks traded in international markets allowed us to find evidence of 
heterogeneity among investors with regard to their interest in past performance and managerial 
quality as predictors of future environmental performance. In particular, US-traded stock returns 
were jointly affected by past performance (EIS) and one of the measures of managerial quality 
(GPS), contrasting with non-US-traded stock returns which responded only to managerial quality 
(GPS). These results have implications for the construction of optimal environmental rankings 
(Chatterji, Levine, and Toffel 2009), suggesting that the weight on past performance and 
managerial quality used to construct indexes environmental performance should differ across 
stock markets. 
Provided the measurement errors in the G100 are relatively small, the robustness of the 
findings not only implies that the G100 had relevant information for the market, but also 
supports the idea that companies should account for the effect on stock prices when making 
decisions about environmental policies that might affect their position in the G100. Whether the 
reason for such reaction is branding (to build a positive reputation and brand image), 
stakeholding (to satisfy different stakeholders), sustainability (to contribute to long-term 
sustainable development), or ethics/morals (to do the ‘right thing’), among other possible 
theoretical explanations, is an issue to be addressed in future research. 
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Table 1. Event day abnormal returns statistics for different company groups  
  average median max min Std. dev. 
All 0.0025 0.0023 0.0343 -0.0277 0.0114 
US 0.0006 0.0009 0.0343 -0.0277 0.0098 
Non-US 0.0072 0.0092 0.0340 -0.0213 0.0133 
Heavy 0.0002 0.0024 0.0151 -0.0196 0.0091 
Non-Heavy 0.0036 0.0022 0.0343 -0.0277 0.0122 
Banks 0.0091 0.0087 0.0343 -0.0213 0.0148 
 
  
Table 1. Summary statistics of the hundred estimated FFFMs by regression (3). 
 
R-sq nya 000001_ss hsi topix ks11 sbf250 cdax smiexc_sw ftas us-smb us-hml us-umd _cons 
95 percentile 0.7397 1.5084 0.1419 0.0852 0.1885 0.2208 0.4322 0.3732 0.4355 0.4078 0.0040 0.0095 0.0074 0.0012 
75 percentile 0.6172 1.1315 0.0356 0.0238 0.0648 0.0899 0.1959 0.1009 0.1881 0.1401 0.0011 0.0009 0.0025 0.0003 
median 0.4585 0.8851 -0.0121 -0.0180 0.0132 0.0213 -0.0473 -0.0350 0.0800 0.0344 -0.0006 -0.0023 0.0005 -0.0002 
mean 0.4596 0.8906 -0.0203 -0.0015 0.0034 -0.0114 -0.0296 -0.0573 0.0676 0.0434 -0.0004 -0.0010 0.0009 -0.0002 
25 percentile 0.3218 0.6684 -0.0485 -0.0634 -0.0652 -0.0861 -0.2292 -0.2694 -0.0708 -0.0788 -0.0020 -0.0046 -0.0013 -0.0007 
5 percentile 0.1267 0.2734 -0.2239 -0.1304 -0.1541 -0.3617 -0.4741 -0.5910 -0.3255 -0.2664 -0.0039 -0.0070 -0.0053 -0.0018 
Percentage of models 
95% significant 
97 92 5 1 4 9 7 7 9 4 16 31 17 2 
The variables on the table are: SSE Composite Index (000001_SS), Hang Seng Index (hsi), Topix (topix ), Kospi Composite Index (ks11), CAC-All (sbf250), 
SMI Expanded (smiexc_sw), FTSE All-Share Index (ftas), US SMB (us-smb), US HML (us-hml), US UMD (us-umd), and the respective model constant 
(_cons). 
  
   
Figure 1. One-day window regressions for the 100 companies (Left: equation (8), Right 
equation (7)). 
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Table 2. Robust OLS regressions using estimated abnormal returns from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
1.379*** 6.546       
(0.476) (4.583)       
Ranking   
-0.994*** -4.951     
  
(0.347) (3.691)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.772* -2.999   
    
(0.449) (4.718)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
0.909 11.14   
    
(0.676) (10.195)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.0499 -0.490   
    
(0.633) (1.527)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.504 -1.889 
      
(0.368) (3.201) 
Intercept 
-66.23** -458.5 74.91*** 223.2** -70.70** -504.9 27.96** -39.08 
(31.977) (380.179) (21.751) (111.529) (34.215) (425.466) (12.504) (102.038) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.057 0.025 0.064 0.031 0.087 0.060 0.024 0.006 
AIC 1228.356 1625.604 1227.649 1625.014 1229.160 1625.990 1231.852 1627.496 
Prob >F 0.005 0.156 0.005 0.183 0.022 0.158 0.175 0.556 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000.  
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Table 3. Robust OLS regressions for top 50 performers in the G100 using estimated 
abnormal returns from FFFM for top 50 performers in the G100 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
2.923* 2.343       
(1.496) (2.426)       
Ranking   
-1.706* -1.366     
  
(0.955) (1.485)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
1.557** 2.399**   
    
(0.773) (1.057)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.833* 1.636   
    
(1.089) (1.631)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-0.656 -1.788   
    
(1.095) (1.909)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
1.183* 2.134** 
      
(0.664) (0.986) 
Intercept 
-187.5 -103.2 93.73*** 122.2** -146.3 -78.11 47.27*** 81.97*** 
(125.549) (197.117) (28.083) (47.116) (103.063) (179.111) (15.532) (22.087) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.045 0.013 0.044 0.013 0.131 0.148 0.087 0.132 
AIC 619.961 659.524 619.981 659.530 619.224 656.211 617.687 653.094 
Prob >F 0.057 0.339 0.08 0.362 0.088 0.115 0.081 0.035 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000.  
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Table 4. Robust OLS regressions for bottom 50 in the G100 using estimated abnormal 
returns from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
0.324 6.063       
(0.900) (5.074)       
Ranking   
-0.119 -10.84     
  
(1.011) (10.535)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.232 -7.845   
    
(0.657) (9.348)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
-0.460 19.08   
    
(1.035) (19.282)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.885 -3.592   
    
(0.756) (5.649)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
-0.183 -6.038 
      
(0.422) (6.362) 
Intercept 
-17.22 -447.4 8.153 677.1 -31.87 -549.0 -3.653 -234.2 
(44.514) (405.690) (81.045) (642.647) (41.549) (500.485) (17.898) (254.980) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.002 0.007 0.000 0.019 0.024 0.081 0.004 0.040 
AIC 609.971 848.260 610.070 847.622 612.887 848.366 609.867 846.552 
Prob >F 0.720 0.238 0.907 0.309 0.664 0.741 0.667 0.347 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 22 of the bottom 50 companies are in the heavy sector. 
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Table 5. Robust OLS regressions for non-heavy sector using estimated abnormal returns 
from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
2.007** 14.76       
(0.819) (13.382)       
Ranking   
-1.215** -8.804     
  
(0.513) (7.840)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
1.287** -2.178   
    
(0.513) (4.143)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.100 19.46   
    
(0.971) (18.139)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.394 -0.441   
    
(0.850) (2.844)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.663 -2.374 
      
(0.448) (3.843) 
Intercept 
-106.5* -1093.9 89.38*** 340.5 -134.6** -1122.7 35.06** -37.84 
(59.253) (1069.415) (27.795) (228.181) (64.829) (1022.288) (14.562) (116.028) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R2 0.065 0.053 0.068 0.054 0.125 0.102 0.037 0.007 
AIC 821.047 1098.872 820.882 1098.850 820.706 1099.400 823.044 1102.012 
Prob >F 0.017 0.274 0.021 0.266 0.028 0.317 0.144 0.539 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000.  
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Table 6. Robust OLS regressions for heavy sector using estimated abnormal returns from 
FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
0.538 1.996       
(0.639) (1.201)       
Ranking   
-0.421 -1.274     
  
(0.477) (0.924)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
-0.894 0.367   
    
(1.073) (1.705)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
0.972 1.332   
    
(0.847) (1.385)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.105 0.330   
    
(0.882) (1.747)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
-0.565 -0.232 
      
(0.671) (1.419) 
Intercept 
-28.07 -106.9 28.79 85.71 -25.00 -91.59 -11.19 -1.183 
(39.066) (75.920) (33.391) (59.274) (38.443) (69.964) (21.551) (40.070) 
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R2 0.018 0.084 0.018 0.057 0.060 0.058 0.027 0.002 
AIC 406.310 440.875 406.302 441.871 408.814 445.815 405.988 443.797 
Prob >F 0.406 0.106 0.384 0.177 0.523 0.428 0.406 0.871 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 7. Robust OLS regressions for US traded stocks using estimated abnormal returns 
from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
1.645*** 10.31       
(0.473) (8.101)       
Ranking   
-1.130*** -7.192     
  
(0.306) (5.595)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.564’’ -7.829   
    
(0.532) (7.941)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
0.819’’ 16.77   
    
(0.632) (14.169)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.339 0.107   
    
(0.584) (2.124)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.248 -5.187 
      
(0.386) (5.538) 
Intercept 
-107.5*** -816.9 58.14*** 226.6 -91.83*** -756.6 7.473 -148.0 
(32.222) (665.857) (19.939) (153.682) (32.021) (595.928) (13.323) (153.712) 
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R2 0.096 0.041 0.111 0.048 0.101 0.116 0.006 0.029 
AIC 849.688 1175.291 848.516 1174.717 853.297 1173.515 856.393 1176.124 
Prob >F 0.001 0.207 0 0.203 0.02 0.573 0.522 0.352 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. ’’ represents 95% jointly significance. Standard deviations are shown between 
parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
 
  
40 
 
Table 8. Robust OLS regressions for non-US traded stocks using estimated abnormal 
returns from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
2.112* 4.709**       
(1.053) (1.701)       
Ranking   
-1.710* -3.235**     
  
(0.978) (1.495)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
-0.104 1.615’’   
    
(0.812) (1.245)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
4.482** 4.828’’   
    
(2.031) (3.361)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-2.568 -3.023   
    
(1.693) (2.895)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.740 2.091* 
      
(0.697) (1.067) 
Intercept 
-53.25 -106.6 174.6** 366.5*** -16.55 -0.538 74.08*** 178.8*** 
(62.343) (99.587) (66.266) (100.294) (119.485) (144.280) (25.967) (38.507) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R2 0.110 0.212 0.115 0.159 0.224 0.262 0.054 0.168 
AIC 366.695 390.574 366.537 392.447 366.703 392.658 368.455 392.154 
Prob >F 0.055 0.01 0.092 0.039 0.102 0.082 0.298 0.061 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. ’’ represents 95% jointly significance. Standard deviations are shown between 
parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 9. Robust OLS regressions for US traded stocks in non-Heavy sectors using 
estimated abnormal returns from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
2.636*** 27.94       
(0.665) (23.707)       
Ranking   
-1.500*** -15.60     
  
(0.424) (13.162)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
1.235** -7.599   
    
(0.575) (7.751)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.018 36.40   
    
(0.799) (28.496)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.665 0.932   
    
(0.756) (4.814)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.603 -6.042 
      
(0.459) (6.893) 
Intercept 
-181.9*** -2241.2 71.54*** 434.1 -168.5*** -2207.9 13.91 -165.6 
(47.612) (1925.961) (25.191) (343.148) (58.698) (1698.705) (16.110) (181.229) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
R2 0.131 0.117 0.128 0.110 0.168 0.234 0.035 0.028 
AIC 533.299 746.675 533.433 747.001 535.373 744.433 537.922 750.918 
Prob >F 0 0.245 0.001 0.242 0.021 0.612 0.196 0.386 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Appendix 
 
 
Table 10. Robust OLS regressions using estimated abnormal returns from market model 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
1.989*** 1.373**       
(0.520) (0.673)       
Ranking   
-1.359*** -1.099**     
  
(0.389) (0.486)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.834 0.757   
    
(0.509) (0.736)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.538** 1.177   
    
(0.733) (1.315)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-0.429 -0.451   
    
(0.569) (1.168)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.699 0.656 
      
(0.422) (0.445) 
Intercept 
-121.8*** -64.48 77.94*** 81.53*** -99.12*** -55.96 13.84 30.28* 
(32.848) (45.981) (25.706) (29.827) (34.291) (56.568) (14.112) (18.221) 
Observations 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 100 
R2 0.097 0.026 0.097 0.035 0.114 0.043 0.037 0.018 
AIC 1244.714 1310.939 1244.694 1309.944 1246.842 1313.143 1251.117 1311.705 
Prob >F 0 0.044 0.001 0.0260 0.008 0.144 0.101 0.143 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 11. Robust OLS regressions for non-heavy sectors using estimated abnormal returns 
from market model 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
2.862*** 2.415**       
(0.929) (1.132)       
Ranking   
-1.724*** -1.522**     
  
(0.575) (0.718)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
1.473** 1.814**   
    
(0.597) (0.692)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.891* 0.521   
    
(1.091) (1.520)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-0.00377 0.974   
    
(0.774) (1.142)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.877* 0.851 
      
(0.493) (0.560) 
Intercept 
-186.0*** -129.1 92.94*** 109.2*** -191.5*** -157.1 16.00 41.14* 
(64.745) (84.436) (33.243) (35.500) (71.067) (99.181) (16.656) (20.920) 
Observations 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 66 
R2 0.099 0.047 0.101 0.053 0.150 0.094 0.048 0.030 
AIC 838.356 868.103 838.170 867.699 838.451 868.810 841.992 869.278 
Prob >F 0.003 0.037 0.004 0.038 0.014 0.044 0.08 0.134 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 12. Robust OLS regressions for heavy sectors using estimated abnormal returns 
from market model 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
1.306* -0.155       
(0.684) (1.039)       
Ranking   
-0.829 -0.000780     
  
(0.513) (0.852)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
-0.404 -2.935   
    
(0.876) (2.295)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.573* 2.490   
    
(0.847) (2.007)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-0.504 -1.267   
    
(0.929) (1.530)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
-0.0889 -0.804 
      
(0.739) (0.991) 
Intercept 
-79.90* 1.869 45.78 -6.719 -46.49 26.99 -9.299 -25.35 
(39.797) (55.752) (36.135) (66.537) (31.927) (87.210) (18.999) (44.977) 
Observations 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 34 
R2 0.121 0.001 0.081 0.000 0.101 0.162 0.001 0.019 
AIC 398.193 443.790 399.710 443.807 402.934 441.789 402.538 443.167 
Prob >F 0.065 0.882 0.116 0.999 0.282 0.601 0.905 0.423 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 13. Robust OLS regressions for US-traded stocks using estimated abnormal returns 
from market model 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
1.988*** 1.952*       
(0.593) (0.983)       
Ranking   
-1.343*** -1.489**     
  
(0.402) (0.583)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.807’’ -0.0864   
    
(0.742) (1.007)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
1.241’’ 1.894   
    
(0.828) (1.584)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-0.214 -0.233   
    
(0.585) (1.266)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.598 0.0199 
      
(0.567) (0.582) 
Intercept 
-133.9*** -136.8* 65.26** 66.60** -101.0*** -101.3 7.370 -2.526 
(38.426) (71.135) (26.923) (31.946) (35.628) (68.621) (17.871) (21.413) 
Observations 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 71 
R2 0.089 0.052 0.100 0.074 0.097 0.051 0.023 0.000 
AIC 882.069 920.383 881.247 918.702 885.435 924.494 887.051 924.187 
Prob >F 0.0013 0.051 0.001 0.013 0.036 0.356 0.296 0.973 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. ’’ represents 95% jointly significance.  Standard deviations are shown between 
parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 14. Robust OLS regressions for non-US traded stocks using estimated abnormal 
returns from market model 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
2.647** 2.025**       
(1.046) (0.922)       
Ranking   
-1.982* -1.550*     
  
(0.998) (0.842)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.199 0.900’’   
    
(0.761) (0.858)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
4.224** 2.894’’   
    
(1.901) (2.030)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-2.067 -2.311   
    
(1.528) (1.810)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
0.803 1.352* 
      
(0.671) (0.660) 
Intercept 
-131.0** -23.29 144.8** 189.7** -93.43 25.03 28.12 100.9*** 
(59.912) (43.152) (68.073) (68.595) (110.493) (111.093) (25.199) (32.111) 
Observations 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 29 
R2 0.177 0.059 0.158 0.055 0.235 0.150 0.065 0.106 
AIC 363.693 383.823 364.351 383.943 365.565 384.881 367.372 382.347 
Prob >F 0.018 0.037 0.057 0.077 0.114 0.051 0.242 0.051 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. ’’ represents 95% jointly significance. Standard deviations are shown between 
parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 15. Top 50 FF9FM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
3.569** 5.685*       
(1.543) (2.928)       
Ranking   
-2.157** -3.533**     
  
(0.935) (1.743)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
1.874** 1.411   
    
(0.893) (1.009)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
2.304** 3.924   
    
(0.975) (2.435)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
-0.850 -1.045   
    
(1.043) (1.919)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
1.442* 1.162 
      
(0.718) (0.781) 
Intercept 
-248.8* -414.0* 96.49*** 138.5*** -198.3* -266.6* 37.87** 45.51* 
(127.529) (243.894) (31.200) (45.493) (107.809) (145.600) (17.956) (22.791) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.048 0.085 0.051 0.096 0.142 0.128 0.094 0.043 
AIC 635.909 651.756 635.748 651.174 634.700 653.381 633.458 654.045 
Prob >F 0.025 0.058 0.025 0.048 0.022 0.058 0.05 0.143 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table 16. Bottom 50 FF9FM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
1.294 -0.134       
(0.936) (1.495)       
Ranking   
-0.994 0.114     
  
(1.109) (1.958)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    
0.0861 0.553   
    
(0.694) (1.184)   Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    
0.467 -1.583   
    
(1.301) (1.905)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    
0.129 1.007   
    
(0.801) (1.045)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      
-0.0882 0.134 
      
(0.484) (0.600) 
Intercept 
-88.25* 10.41 52.24 -4.937 -53.04 5.751 -24.20 5.716 
(46.548) (66.628) (87.308) (160.300) (40.464) (89.348) (18.405) (30.228) 
Observations 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 50 
R2 0.036 0.000 0.019 0.000 0.007 0.019 0.001 0.001 
AIC 607.899 659.485 608.763 659.488 613.392 662.547 609.685 659.449 
Prob >F 0.173 0.929 0.374 0.954 0.915 0.760 0.856 0.825 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
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Table A8. Robust OLS regressions for US traded stocks in non-Heavy sectors using 
estimated abnormal returns from FFFM 
 
  Model 1-a Model 1-b Model 2-a Model 2-b Model 3-a Model 3-b Model 4-a Model 4-b 
Green Score 
3.378*** 3.582**       
(1.046) (1.484)       
Ranking   
-1.924*** -2.209**     
  (0.637) (0.857)     
Environmental 
impact score 
    1.618* 1.096   
    (0.831) (0.927)   
Green policies 
and 
performance 
score 
    1.620 0.886   
    (1.405) (1.706)   
Reputation 
survey score 
    0.0657 2.115*   
    (0.850) (1.083)   
Env. Impact – 
Rep Survey 
      1.046 0.0423 
      (0.681) (0.727) 
Intercept 
-242.6*** -253.3** 82.26** 97.65** -201.5** -239.6* 8.311 12.77 
(75.559) (112.512) (35.657) (39.222) (89.391) (127.966) (21.541) (23.274) 
Observations 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 44 
R2 0.117 0.120 0.115 0.138 0.150 0.137 0.057 0.000 
AIC 560.572 564.677 560.677 563.764 562.894 567.810 563.491 570.294 
Prob >F 0.002 0.020 0.004 0.014 0.049 0.156 0.132 0.954 
Note: "a" and "b" denote models estimated using one- and two-day windows, respectively.*, ** and *** represent 
90, 95 and 99% significance. Standard deviations are shown between parentheses for each coefficient. Coefficients 
and standard deviations are multiplied by 10,000. 
 
